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During his presidency, Bill Clinton appointed almost half of
the presently sitting federal appellate and district court judges.
He, therefore, can justifiably claim that he has left a lasting
imprint on the federal judiciary. During his 1992 presidential
campaign, Clinton promised to choose intelligent, diligent, and
independent judges who would increase balance, vigorously enforce
fundamental constitutional rights, and possess measured judicial
temperament. The initial achievement of the Clinton
Administration in selecting members of the federal bench, who
make it more diverse and who are exceptionally qualified,
demonstrates that the President fulfilled these campaign pledges.
President Clinton named unprecedented numbers and percentages
of highly competent female and minority judges during his first
two years in office. The record compiled is important, because
diverse judges can improve their colleagues' understanding of
complex questions that the federal courts must decide, might
reduce bias in the justice process, and may increase the confidence
of the American people in the federal judiciary.
After 1994, however, President Clinton encountered greater
difficulty in appointing women and minorities, as well as in filling
the perennial federal court vacancies, primarily because the
Republican Party had captured a large majority in the U.S.
Senate. The adversity he faced was particularly salient during
2000 when partisan politics, especially involving the presidential
election, pervaded the confirmation process and when his power
reached its nadir at the end of a two-term administration. Indeed,
as late as May 2000, there were eighty openings on the appeals and
district courts, a figure that constitutes nearly ten percent of the
lower federal court judgeships that Congress has authorized. The
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las
Vegas. I wish to thank Jay Bybee, Michael Higdon and Peggy Sanner for valuable
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Law and Inequality
approach that the President would take to choose more women
and minorities and to name judges for the vacancies was,
therefore, somewhat unclear. Now that the Clinton
Administration has concluded its second term, the selection
process during the final year merits scrutiny. This Essay
undertakes that effort by emphasizing how the President
attempted to appoint additional female and minority judges and to
fill the empty seats. '
In 2000, President Clinton minimally changed the judicial
recruitment objectives and procedures that he and officials with
responsibility for choosing judges had previously employed. Part I of
this Essay, accordingly, evaluates selection throughout the
administration and focuses on the process during 1993. I
determine that President Clinton articulated clear goals and
instituted effective practices, principally by searching for,
identifying, and nominating extremely capable women and
minorities. Part II analyzes the appointment of judges in the second
administration's last year, exploring those developments that were
significant or different. This assessment ascertains that the
President forwarded the names of numerous female and minority
attorneys who are very talented and able candidates for many of the
appellate and district court openings, but realized less success in
having the individuals confirmed. Part III, therefore, provides
suggestions for recruiting judges that the new President should
consult.
I. Federal Judicial Selection in the First Seven Years
The judicial selection process over the first seven years of the
Clinton Administration warrants comparatively brief discussion in
this Essay because the relevant history has been rather
comprehensively reviewed elsewhere. 2 The Clinton Administration
enunciated praiseworthy objectives for choosing judges and deployed
effective procedures to achieve those goals. For example, President
Clinton clearly proclaimed that increasing the numbers and
percentages of highly skilled women and minorities on the bench
would be a critical administration priority. Clinton and his
1. See Carl Tobias, Closing the Gender Gap on the Federal Courts, 61 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1237, 1247 n.51 (1993) (analyzing certain difficulties that are entailed in
enhancing racial diversity).
2. 1 rely substantially in this subsection on Sheldon Goldman, Judicial
Selection Under Clinton: A Midterm Examination, 78 JUDICATURE 276 (1995);
Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's Second Term Judiciary: Picking
Judges Under Fire, 82 JUDICATURE 265 (1999); Carl Tobias, Filling the Federal
Courts in an Election Year, 49 SMU L. REV. 309 (1996).
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administration also worked closely with senators, asking that they
designate competent female and minority counsel.
A. Selection During 1993
The selection of judges during 1993 deserves emphasis
primarily because the objectives espoused and the practices
prescribed and applied were followed in subsequent years. Officials
who played important roles in recruiting judges deviated infrequently
from these goals and procedures. The administration attempted to
honor the campaign commitments that Clinton had made during
the 1992 presidential election campaign. 3  For instance, the
President repeated his promise to appoint very capable attorneys
who would enhance gender, racial, and political diversity in the
federal courts.4 Attorney General Janet Reno and White House
Counsel Bernard W. Nussbaum, officers with central responsibility
for choosing judges, correspondingly stated that the administration
would name lawyers who had strong qualifications and who would
promote balance. 5 Personnel in the Department of Justice and the
Office of the White House Counsel, the specific Executive Branch
components that provided the President the greatest assistance,
also clearly subscribed to these objectives and implemented
effective measures to attain these goals.
6
The particular practices that the Clinton Administration
invoked resembled quite closely the measures that President
Jimmy Carter used. However, the procedures instituted also
minimally departed from the processes that President George
3. See, e.g., Bill Clinton, Judiciary Suffers Racial, Sexual Lack of Balance,
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 2, 1992, at 15-16; Bush v. Clinton: The Candidates on Legal Issues,
A.B.A. J., Oct. 1992, at 57-58 (stating Clinton's desire for a more diverse judiciary).
4. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, Clinton May Use Diversity Pledge to Remake
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1993, at Al; Neil A. Lewis, Unmaking the G.O.P. Court
Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1993, at A10; Susan Page, Suprene Matter on Home
Front, NEWSDAY (Long Island, New York), Mar. 24, 1993, at 4 (reaffirming the
Clinton Administration's vow to appoint more women and minorities to the federal
judiciary, but also noting that Clinton's primary concern was that the appointee
would be a "great justice"); see also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
5. See Tom Hamburger & Josephine Marcotty, Two Proposed for U.S. Court by
Wellstone, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis, Minnesota), Mar. 10, 1993, at IA; Al
Kamen, When Vacancies Are "Judicial Emergencies," WASH. PoST, Apr. 26, 1993, at
A17; White House Counsel Discusses Nation's Legal Agenda, THIRD BRANCH, Sept.
1993, at 1 (interviewing Bernard W. Nussbaum and noting the Clinton
Administration's goal of naming diverse men and women to serve on the federal
bench).
6. These ideas and many that follow are premised on conversations with
individuals who are familiar with administration selection procedures. See also
Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's First Term Judiciary: Many Bridges to
Cross, 80 JUDICATURE 254, 254-55 (1997).
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Bush and President Ronald Reagan employed.7 The Office of the
White House Counsel had substantial responsibility for
delineating and proposing possible nominees, and the Department
of Justice generally assumed an active role only after individuals
had become serious candidates.
Traditional notions of senatorial patronage and courtesy also
figured prominently in the choice of nominees for the federal
district courts because Clinton and his staff typically deferred to
senators who represented states that experienced judicial
openings.8 Senators usually recommended multiple prospects from
whom the President selected a nominee. 9  Clinton and his
administration also specifically requested that senators employ or
revive district court nominating commissions, which had promoted
the confirmation of numerous female and minority attorneys during
the Carter Administration. 10
Even though the Clinton Administration evinced considerable
solicitude for senators from those areas where the openings arose
and did not revitalize the Circuit Judge Nominating Commission
that President Carter had implemented, 1' it exercised greater
authority over candidate selection for appellate court vacancies. For
example, President Clinton was actively involved in designating
7. See SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT
SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 236-345 (1997); see also Curtis
Reidy, Clinton Gets His Thrn, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, Aug. 8, 1993, at 69 (stating
that President Clinton would use procedures much like those of former President
Bush); see also supra note 6 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Clinton is Considering Judgeships for Opponents of
Abortion Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1993, at 1; Michael York, Clout Sought in
Choosing U.S. Judges, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 1993, at D3; see also supra note 6 and
accompanying text.
9. See Goldman, supra note 2, at 278-79.
10. See ALAN NEFF, THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE NOMINATING
COMMISSIONS: THEIR MEMBERS, PROCEDURES, AND CANDIDATES 27-87 (1981)
(describing in great detail judicial nominating commissions under the Carter
Administration); see also Elaine Martin, Gender and Judicial Selection: A
Comparison of the Reagan and Carter Administrations, 71 JUDICATURE 136, 141
(1987); Carl Tobias, The Gender Gap on the Federal Bench, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV.
171, 174 (1990); Lewis, supra note 4 (mentioning diverse judicial appointments
during the Carter Administration).
11. See Goldman, supra note 2, at 279 (stating that the Clinton Nominating
Commissions were similar to the Nomination Commissions of Presidents Reagan
and Bush); Reidy, supra note 7, at 69 (stating that Clinton was expected to "rubber
stamp" the senators' recommendations); see also GOLDMAN, supra note 7, at 238-45
(outlining Carter's involvement in the reform of the judicial selection process). See
generally LARRY C. BERKSON & SUSAN B. CARBON, THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT
JUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSION: ITS MEMBERS, PROCEDURES AND CANDIDATES
(1980) (describing the Judge Nominating Commission).
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Circuit Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg as his first appointee to the
United States Supreme Court.
12
The Clinton Administration facilitated the confirmation of
nominees whom it submitted by informally consulting with the
Senate Judiciary Committee and with particular senators about the
candidates before formally nominating specific individuals. 13 This
practice apparently led to the noncontroversial confirmation of
Judge Ginsburg who, for example, received the endorsement of
Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), the ranking Republican on the
Judiciary Committee. 14 Moreover, senators judiciously exercised
their power of advice and consent. The Senate Judiciary
Committee, which has historically exercised substantial control
over the confirmation process, was receptive to the
Administration's goals for choosing judges and worked carefully
with the President and his assistants. For instance, Senator
Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (D-Del.), the Chair of the Committee,
proclaimed that no "ideological blood test" would apply to
nominees who possessed politically moderate or liberal viewpoints
but that candidates should increase balance. 15  Moreover,
numerous members of the Senate invoked, or reinstated, district
court nominating panels, which fostered the Carter
Administration's appointment of many talented women and
minorities. 16
Clinton initiated special efforts to seek out, propose and
promote the candidacies of capable female and minority counsel.
The President, the White House Counsel, and additional high-
ranking government officials strongly declared that naming very
qualified women and minorities was a significant administration
12. See Carl Tobias, Keeping the Covenant on the Federal Courts, 47 SMU L.
REV. 1861, 1870 (1994); Martin Kasindorf & Timothy M. Phelps, In Suprente
Company, NEWSDAY (New York, New York), Aug. 4, 1993, at 23; see also Angie
Cannon, Clinton Reshaping Federal Bench with Female and Minority Picks, THE
HERALD (Miami, Florida), Oct. 13, 1994, at 12A (stating that President Clinton
actively participated in selecting lower federal court judges). See generally
Goldman, supra note 2, at 279 (discussing Clinton's judicial selection process).
13. See Goldman, supra note 2, at 278-79; see also Goldman & Slotnick, supra
note 2, at 266-67 (explaining the judicial selection process under the Clinton
Administration).
14. See, e.g., William E. Clayton, Jr., Panel Endorses Ginsburg, Hous. CHRON.,
July 30, 1993, at 20 (noting that the Senate Judiciary Committee voted
unanimously to recommend Ginsburg to the full Senate for confirmation);
Kasindorf & Phelps, supra note 12.
15. Labaton, supra note 4; see also Goldman, supra note 2, at 279 (finding that
Senator Biden was committed to diversity); Lewis, supra note 4 (affording more
ideas on judicial selection of Senator Biden).
16. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text (discussing the use of judicial
nominating commissions to promote diversity in the judiciary).
2001]
Law and Inequality
priority.' 7 Several influential leaders, such as Janet Reno, the
Attorney General, and Eleanor Dean Acheson, the Assistant
Attorney General for the Office of Policy Development, who had
substantial responsibility for denominating candidates, are women. '8
These officers correspondingly pursued and capitalized on the ideas
and suggestions for female and minority nominees of national,
state, and local women's organizations; public interest groups; and
minority political associations.
Several senators seemed predisposed to institute approaches
that would lead to the identification and recommendation of more
women and minorities, while administration prodding might have
prompted other members of the upper chamber to implement
similar measures. 19 For example, some senators closely conferred
with certain women's organizations and minority political groups
about promising prospects generally and about specific
individuals. Other senators recommended female and minority
candidates 20 or used advisory panels that proposed numerous
female and minority lawyers.
21
In 1993, the President appointed eleven women (39%) and
seven minorities (25%) out of twenty-eight attorneys to the federal
courts. 22 Of his forty-eight nominees, eighteen (37%) were women;
thirteen (27%) were minorities. 23 No president has ever named or
17. See Cannon, supra note 12 (stating that President Clinton actively
participated in selecting lower federal court judges and noting that "[d]uring
Clinton's first two years in office, 58 percent of his nominations for federal
judgeships have been women and minorities, a much higher proportion than any
previous President."); see also supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text (reporting on
the Clinton Administration's commitment to diversity in the federal judiciary).
18. See Goldman, supra note 2, at 279.
19. A senior officer in the White House stated that the administration told all
Democratic senators that "we expect their recommendations to include women and
minorities." Lewis, supra note 4; see also supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text
(discussing the use of judicial nominating commissions to promote diversity in the
judiciary).
20. The Judiciary Committee conducted hearings on two African-American
attorneys and one female lawyer whom Senator Robert Graham recommended, and
two women and one African American whom Senator Edward Kennedy
recommended. See Mark Ballard, New Contenders for 5th Circuit, TEX. LAW., Sept.
13, 1993, at 1; Cannon, supra note 12 (stating that President Clinton actively
participated in selecting lower federal court judges).
21. See Hamburger & Marcotty, supra note 5 (noting that Senator Wellstone
formed a special advisory committee to guide the selection process). See generally
Goldman, supra note 2, at 279 (describing the Clinton selection committee).
22. Telephone Interview with George Kassouf, Alliance for Justice (Nov. 19,
1993).
23. See id.; see also Goldman, supra note 2, at 290 tbl.5 (comparing the




nominated such substantial numbers and percentages of women and
minorities during his initial year in office.
24
The attorneys whom the Clinton Administration appointed or
nominated possessed excellent qualifications. The individuals seem
quite intelligent, industrious, and independent, while apparently
having much integrity and appropriately balanced judicial
temperament. Many of the individuals confirmed and nominated
had previously rendered outstanding service as members of the
federal or state court bench. For example, Justice Ginsburg was a
distinguished jurist on the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit for thirteen years before the President
elevated her to the Supreme Court.
25
In short, the President named and nominated a substantial
number of highly competent women and minorities. Clinton
enunciated laudable goals for selecting judges and implemented
effective procedures, particularly by searching for, nominating, and
advocating the confirmation of, very capable female and minority
lawyers. The Administration's success is especially commendable,
given the significant complications that it confronted. First,
President Clinton and his aides faced the difficulties that every
new administration must experience in the initial year, and several
developments compounded these inherent problems. Most
important, a Democrat had not occupied the White House since
1980. The Administration, therefore, had no applicable federal
judicial selection model, and no personnel possessing relevant
experience, from within the last twelve years.26 Second, the
President and those who helped him choose judges encountered
certain phenomena that were peculiar so early in the life of the
Administration. For instance, the resignation from the Supreme
Court of Justice Byron R. White only two months after the
inauguration required considerable effort of the Office of White House
Counsel staff responsible for recruiting judges.27 Time and energy
that these employees consumed to identify an exceptional successor
for Justice White limited their pursuit of nominees for the appellate
24. See Tobias, supra note 12, at 1866; see also Al Kamen, Vow on Federal
Judges Still on Hold, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1993, at A25 (noting that twenty-one of
Clinton's first thirty-three nominees were women or minorities).
25. See supra notes 12, 14 and accompanying text.
26. See Ruth Marcus, President Asks Wider Court Hunt, WASH. POST, May 6,
1993, at Al; see also Goldman, supra note 2, at 276-79.
27. See Joan Biskupic, Promises, Pressures in Court Search, WASH. POST, Mar.
21, 1993, at Al; Linda Greenhouse, White Announces He'll Step Down front High
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1993, at 1.
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and district courts.28 Therefore, President Clinton compiled an
enviable record in light of the obstacles that he experienced during
1993.
B. Selection During the Subsequent Six Years
Federal judicial selection over the subsequent six years of the
Clinton Administration requires rather limited assessment in this
essay primarily because the objectives and practices which the
President employed were analogous to those used earlier.
Nevertheless, some examination of certain important developments
that occurred in this period is justified, as the treatment should
increase comprehension of the process for choosing judges during
2000 and enhance understanding of judicial appointments in the
new Administration. Perhaps the most compelling consideration
was Republican control over the Senate, which commenced during
1995 and continued for the remainder of President Clinton's time in
office.
1. Selection During 1994
The distinguishing characteristic of judicial selection in 1994
was the close cooperation between the Clinton Administration and
the Senate Judiciary Committee. The President and those personnel
with responsibility for recruiting judicial candidates worked carefully
with the Committee, and numerous senators were quite responsive
to the Administration's goals in appointing judges. Senator Biden
repeated the panel's commitment to according the confirmation
process a very high priority.29 The Chair asked that the President
submit nominations steadily, a practice which facilitated the
Committee's discharge of its duties, and requested that the
American Bar Association (ABA) devote sufficient resources to
complete expeditious evaluation of nominees. 30 These cooperative
efforts fostered the relatively noncontroversial elevation of First
Circuit Judge Stephen Breyer to the Supreme Court. For example,
28. See Kamen, supra note 5. White House Counsel and Justice Department
staff also spent much effort on the Waco, Texas standoff. See David Johnston &
Stephen Labaton, Doubts on Reno's Competence Rise in Justice Dept., N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 26, 1993, at Al; see also Text of Rends Letter Recommending Dismissal, WASH.
POST, July 20, 1993, at All (assessing the effort expended on a dispute over the
FBI Director).
29. See Carl Tobias, Increasing Balance on the Federal Bench, 32 HOUS. L. REV.
137, 147 n.51 (1995) (referring to a letter from Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chair,
U.S. Senate Judiciary Comm., to Chief U.S. District Judges (June 6, 1994)).
30. See id.; see also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE ABA'S STANDING
COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY: WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS (1991)
(discussing the role of the ABA in the federal judicial nomination process).
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Senator Hatch and Senator Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), the senior
Republicans who served on the Judiciary Committee, supported the
candidate. 31 Moreover, many senators depended on current or
revitalized district court nominating commissions to identify and
promote the appointment of well-qualified women and minorities.
Many senators also recommended numerous, talented female and
minority attorneys for the positions which became vacant.
In 1994, President Clinton named twenty-nine women (29%)
and thirty-seven (37%) minorities out of 101 judges. 32 He also
nominated twenty-six women (27%) and thirty minorities (31%)
out of ninety-five lawyers.33 The numbers and percentages of
females and minorities nominated and confirmed are unprecedented;
the figures easily surpassed the statistics for the Reagan
Administration and were substantially larger than the achievements
of Presidents Bush and Carter.
34
The attorneys named and nominated by the Clinton
Administration were exceptionally competent. Numerous
individuals had been very well respected members of the federal or
state court bench.35 For instance, Judge Jose Cabranes was an
outstanding federal district judge in Connecticut before he joined
the Second Circuit and has received serious consideration for
several vacancies on the Supreme Court.36 Moreover, the ABA
assigned sixty-three percent of the nominees whom the President
tendered the highest ranking as well qualified; this number was ten
31. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Senators Question Breyer's Economics, WASH.
POST, July 15, 1994, at A6; Open Minds ?, NAVL LJ., July 25, 1994, at A18.
32. See Tobias, supra note 29, at 138 n.4 (referring to DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
CLINTON ADMINISTRATION JUDICIAL RECORD, ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS
(1994)); Telephone Interview with Barbara Moulton, Alliance for Justice,
Washington, D.C. (Sept. 28, 1994). There were more appointees than nominees
because some persons whom the President nominated in 1993 were confirmed in
1994. See Tobias, supra, at 145 n.40.
33. See Tobias, supra note 29, at 138 n.4.
34. See Tobias, supra note 29, at 145; see also Angie Cannon, Clinton Reshaping
Federal Bench with Female and Minority Picks, HERALD (Miami, Florida), Oct. 13,
1994, at 12A (stating that President Clinton actively participated in selecting lower
federal court judges and noting that "[d]uring Clinton's first two years in office, 58
percent of his nominations for federal judgeships have been women and minorities,
a much higher proportion than any previous President."); Henry J. Reske, Judicial
Vacancies Declining, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1995, at 24 (noting that Clinton met the
challenge of filling the most vacancies in the history of the federal judiciary).
35. See Keith C. Epstein, More Minorities, Women Named Federal Judges,
PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Sept. 25, 1994, at 1A (stating that Clinton is
naming a far greater number of women and minorities to federal judgeships, many
of whom have extensive experience as state judges or federal magistrates).
36. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Mitchell, Cabranes Said to Top High Court List,
WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1994, at Al; On the Short List, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 1994, at
C6; David G. Savage, Short List for the High Court, A.B.A. J., July 1999, at 32.
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percentage points greater than the ratings earned by those
lawyers whose names the Reagan and Bush Administrations
submitted.
37
President Clinton, accordingly, also had a strong judicial
selection record in the second year of his administration. The
President was quite successful, especially given the significant
difficulties that arose. For example, Philip Heymann and Webster
Hubbell, the initial Deputy and Associate Attorneys General, and
Bernard W. Nussbaum, the first White House Counsel, tendered
their resignations in 1994. 38 When Justice Harry Blackmun
decided to leave the Supreme Court early that year, the
Administration devoted considerable time and energy to searching for
a suitable replacement, using resources which otherwise would have
been committed to filling lower federal court vacancies. 39 Moreover,
the ongoing Whitewater investigation and additional problems
diluted the efforts of staff in the White House Counsel's Office and in
the Justice Department who played important roles in choosing circuit
and district court judges.
2. Selection During 1995
The most salient features of judicial selection from 1995 until
2000 were certain changes in the practices that President Clinton had
followed during the initial half term. 40 The Administration seemingly
instituted these modifications as responses to the Republican Party's
success in winning control of the Senate during the 1994
congressional elections and in enlarging its majority over the
subsequent years of the Clinton presidency. 41 For instance, both the
Office of the White House Counsel and the Department of Justice
maintained substantial responsibility for selecting judges, but
White House personnel apparently assumed a more significant role,
37. See Marcia Coyle, Clinton's Judicial Choices Change the Bench's Face,
NAT'L L.J., Oct. 24, 1994, at A16; Cannon, supra note 12, at 12A; Al Kamen, Cutler
to Face Backlog in Seating Judges, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1994, at A17; see also
Tobias, supra note 2 at 315.
38. See Gwen Ifill, The Whitewater Inquiry: Nussbaum Out as White House
Counsel, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1994, at Al; David Johnston, Reno's Top Deputy
Resigns Abruptly, Citing Differences, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1994, at Al (discussing
Heymann's resignation); Justice Aide Leaves Today, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1994, at
A15 (discussing Hubbell's resignation).
39. See Kamen, supra note 5; Kamen, supra note 37; Marcus supra note 26.
40. Many ideas below are premised on conversations involving individuals who
are familiar with the Administration's practices and on Goldman, supra note 2, at
278-79; Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 6, at 254-57.
41. See supra note 40.
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particularly in designating candidates. 42 The White House staff
evinced increased reluctance to tender nominees who might provoke
controversy, and exhibited a greatly enhanced willingness to
compromise. 43 For example, the President did not resubmit the
names of certain people whom he had nominated in 1994 and who
would probably have proved controversial, 44 while the White
House Counsel expressly proclaimed that the Administration would
not forward lawyers whose candidacies could foster confirmation
battles.
45
President Clinton and his assistants continued their practice of
informally consulting on potential nominees and undertook concerted
efforts to communicate with Senator Hatch when he assumed the
leadership of the Senate Judiciary Committee during 1995.46 The
new Chair publicly declared that the panel would approve each
person who was "qualified, in good health, and [who understood]
the role of judges,"47 and the Committee followed this approach in
1995.48 The Committee generally conducted confirmation hearings
on one appellate court nominee and four or five district court
candidates during every month that Congress was in session.
49
42. See supra note 40.
43. See Goldman, supra note 2, at 279; Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 6, at
255-57, 270.
44. See Stephan 0. Kline, The Topsy-Turvy World of Judicial Confirmation in
the Era of Hatch and Lott, 103 DICK. L. REV. 247, 255-56 (1999); Joan Biskupic,
Facing Fights on Court Nominees, Clinton Yields, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1995, at
Al; Neil A. Lewis, In Selecting Federal Judges, Clinton Has Not Tried to Reverse
Republicans, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1996, at A20; Ana Puga, Clinton Judicial Picks
May Court the Right, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 29, 1994, at 1.
45. See Biskupic, supra note 27; Mikva Moves from Courthouse to White House,
THIRD BRANCH, Sept. 1994, at 1 (interviewing Abner J. Mikva, White House
Counsel, and describing the intricate relationship and interaction between each
branch of the federal government); Henry J. Reske, A New White House Counsel,
A.B.A. J., Oct. 1994, at 32 (relating that Mikva was a well-respected choice for
White House Counsel); see also Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 6, at 255-57.
46. See Tobias, supra note 2, at 317-18; Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 6, at
255-57; see also Neil A. Lewis, New Chief of Judiciary Panel May Find an Early
Test with Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1994, at A31; Senator Orrin Hatch Looks at
Courts, Legislation and Judicial Nominees, THIRD BRANCH, Nov. 1995, at 1 (noting
that the Clinton Administration has consulted Senator Hatch regarding many
judicial nominees).
47. Lewis, supra note 46.
48. See Tobias, supra note 2, at 317-18; Goldman, supra note 2, at 290; Gary A.
Hengstler, At the Seat of Power, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1995, at 70 (relating Orrin G.
Hatch's opinion on several legal issues, including the competency and skill required
to be a judge).
49. See Al Kamen, Window Closing on Judicial Openings, WASH. POST, June
12, 1995, at A17; see also 143 CONG. REC. S2539 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement
of Sen. Biden) (contrasting the Committee's efforts when the Democrats controlled
the Committee and the Republicans controlled the presidency); Kline, supra note
44, at 250 (same).
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In 1995, the Clinton Administration appointed seventeen
female counsel (32%) and eight minority counsel (15%) out of fifty-
three judgeships. 50 The American Bar Association strongly ranked
those individuals whom the President named and nominated. 51 For
example, Seventh Circuit Judge Diane Wood had served with
distinction as a law professor at the University of Chicago and as a
Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Justice Department.
5 2
This selection record was commendable in light of the numerous
complications that the Administration faced, some of which may
have been attributable to it, and some from the Republican Party's
control over the Senate.
3. Selection During 1996
In 1996, the Clinton Administration effectively employed the
practices that it had used during the previous year. The White
House seemingly assumed greater responsibility for choosing
nominees, displaying enhanced amenability to compromise and
appearing especially sensitive to the peculiarities of presidential
election-year politics. These circumstances could well have been
compounded by the fact that Senator Robert Dole (R-Kan.), who
eventually became the Republican Party nominee for the White
House, was also the Senate Majority Leader until his June
resignation. Dole, thus, might have slowed senate confirmation of
judicial nominees lest he evince doubts about his own presidential
candidacy.
From January through July, the Senate approved only three
judges, although the Senate Judiciary Committee had forwarded the
names of twenty-six nominees for consideration on the senate floor.
53
During July, the leaders of the Republican and Democratic Parties
reached a compromise under which they agreed to conduct floor
votes on one candidate per day. 54 This accord enabled President
Clinton to name five female (25%) and four minority (20%)
candidates out of twenty judges in 1996. 55 The persons who
50. Telephone Interview with Deborah Lewis, Alliance for Justice (Jan. 22,
1996); see also Tobias, supra note 2, at 314.
51. See Tobias, supra note 2, at 315.
52. See, e.g., Janan Hanna & John O'Brien, Phelan: Firm "Very, Very Viable"
Despite Loss ofKey People, CHI. TRIB., July 4, 1995, at B3; John Flynn Rooney, New
7th Circuit Judge Seen as 'More Liberal' Member, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., July 3,
1995, at 1.
53. Telephone Interview with Mike Lee, Alliance for Justice (Sept. 3, 1996); see
also Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 6, at 257-58; Kline, supra note 44, at 258-69.
54. See 142 CONG. REC. S7503 (daily ed. July 9, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lott)
(initiating the proposal to review one candidate per day).
55. Lee Interview, supra note 53; see also 142 CONG. REC. S7503 (daily ed. July
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received confirmation were quite talented. For instance, Ninth
Circuit Judge A. Wallace Tashima had served with distinction in
the Central District of California since the late 1970s before being
elevated.5 6 The Administration's selection effort for 1996 was
admirable, given the significant difficulties that election-year
politics presented.
In short, during President Clinton's first term, he fulfilled his
campaign promises to choose more female and minority judges and
attained the goals for judicial selection that the Administration
had established. The President appointed 202 judges to the
federal bench; sixty-two (31%) of the judges were women and forty-
seven (28%) were minorities.5 7 The numbers and percentages are
unparalleled and this record clearly eclipsed those of the three
previous administrations. For example, President Clinton named
more women between 1993 and 1995 than President Bush chose in
four years or the Reagan Administration selected in two terms.
58
The ABA also assigned President Clinton's appointees the highest
ratings since it initially began ranking nominees a half-century
ago.
59
4. Selection During 1997
In the first year of President Clinton's second term, the
Administration essentially invoked the goals and procedures it
had employed during the initial four years. 60 The objectives and
processes the President and his aides depended on were more akin
to those applied in 1995 and 1996 principally because the
Republicans achieved a 55-45 senate majority during the 1996
9, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lott) (stating that philosophical principles did not
animate his attempt "to get the calendar acted on"); Michael J. Gerhardt, Putting
Presidential Performance in the Federal Appointments Process in Perspective, 47
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1359, 1394 (1997) (affording examples of slowed selection in
prior election years).
56. See, e.g., Steve Albert, Clinton Nominates L.A. Judge for Ninth Circuit,
RECORDER (San Francisco, California), Apr. 7, 1995, at 2; Henry Weinstein, Clinton
Nominates L.A. Judge to U.S. Appeals Court, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1995, at B1.
57. See supra notes 22-23, 32-33, 50, 55 and accompanying text (identifying the
number of female and minority judges named by President Clinton during 1993-
1996).
58. See Tobias, supra note 2, at 314; see also Goldman, supra note 2, at 280,
286.
59. See Tobias, supra note 2, at 315; Robert A. Stein, For the Benefit of the
Nation, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1996, at 104 (describing the American Bar Association's
procedure of evaluating the professional qualifications of candidates for
appointment to the federal courts).
60. See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 2, at 265-68 (explicating the second
term selection and confirmation process and its similarity to Clinton's first term);
see also supra notes 2-59 and accompanying text (explaining Clinton's goals and
procedures in judicial selection between 1992-1996).
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congressional elections. The White House maintained substantial
control, which it apparently expanded and consolidated, over the
designation of candidates, especially appellate court nominees, but
deferred to senatorial recommendations for district court
vacancies.61 The Administration concomitantly continued efforts to
identify, tender, and promote the candidacies of well-qualified women
and minorities. For example, President Clinton proffered the
names of two female counsel, as well as one African American and
one Hispanic American federal district judge, for empty seats on
the Ninth Circuit before August 1997.62
The Administration experienced problems in expeditiously
appointing judges during 1997; however, both the President and
Republican Party leaders were partly responsible for these
difficulties. For instance, early in that year, the President may
have provided an insufficient number of nominees whom
Republican senators deemed acceptable and appeared to forward
candidates somewhat erratically thereafter. 63  Several of the
twenty-two individuals whose names President Clinton submitted
on January 7 could have been unpalatable to Senator Hatch or to
his political party,64 and the nomination of thirteen individuals on
July 31, immediately before the Senate's August recess, might well
have created complications in prompt Judiciary Committee
processing. 65
61. See Carl Tobias, Fostering Balance on the Federal Courts, 47 AM. U. L. REV.
935, 951-52 (1998); see also Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 2, at 265-68
(explaining the selection process used by the Clinton Administration); Goldman &
Slotnick, supra note 6, at 254-255 (relating the selection process employed during
Clinton's first term).
62. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, The White House, President
Clinton Nominates Twenty-Two to the Federal Bench (Jan. 7, 1997),
http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.govus/1997/1/7/3.
text.1 (nominating Margaret McKeown and renominating Richard Paez); Press
Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, The White House, President Clinton Nominates
James S. Ware to the Federal Bench (June 27, 1997),
http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1997/6/27/1.
text. 1; Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, The White House, President Clinton
Nominates Susan Graber to the Federal Bench (July 30, 1997),
http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1997/7/31/4.
text. 1.
63. See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 2, at 268 (indicating that the slow pace
of selecting judges could be attributed to the slow pace of nominating judges and
presenting them to the Senate).
64. See Orrin G. Hatch, There's No Vacancy Crisis in the Federal Courts, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 13, 1997, at A15 (indicating that the Senate should not approve
nominees who are activist or who would misuse their authority to implement a
liberal agenda); see also Tobias, supra note 61, at 952.
65. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, The White House, President
Clinton Nominates Thirteen to the Federal Bench (July 31, 1997),
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The Republican leadership correspondingly contributed to the
slow pace of confirmation. For example, Senator Hatch could have
done more to facilitate Judiciary Committee examination of
candidates, especially those who were controversial.66 Senator
Trent Lott (R-Miss.), the Senate Majority Leader, also did not
expeditiously schedule floor debates and votes for some candidates
who had received Judiciary Committee approval.
67
During 1997, the President named six women (17%) and five
minorities (14%) out of thirty-six appointees.68  Clinton
concomitantly nominated nineteen female attorneys (31%) and
twelve minority lawyers (21%) for sixty-one vacancies. 69  The
numbers and percentages of women and minorities nominated were
comparable to the figures compiled four years earlier; however, the
relatively few individuals who received confirmation sharply
contrasted with the eighty-five judges whom President Reagan
appointed during the first year of his second term. 70 All of the
nominees appear to be extremely talented and several of the
district judges submitted were Republican appointees.
7 1
In short, the Clinton Administration had a respectable record of
judicial selection during 1997. The President and his assistants
continued to name and nominate well-qualified women and
http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/19978/l/6.
text. 1; see also 143 CONG. REC. S2522-24 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of
Sen. Grassley) (explaining reasons for assessing nominees cautiously); see id. at
S2538-41 (statement of Sen. Biden) (responding to the Republicans' claims).
66. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. S2536 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) (noting that no one has questioned the qualifications of the nominee,
Merrick Garland); see also Hatch, supra note 64; Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 2,
at 267-69 (indicating one of the problems faced by the Clinton Administration was
that Senator Hatch served as the Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee).
67. See Dan Carney, Clinton's Deals with GOP on Judgeships Stir Discontent
Among Democrats, 57 CONG. Q. WEEKLY 845, 847 (1999) (stating that Senator Lott
has been criticized for blocking nominees for extensive periods of time); see also
Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 2, at 267, 271-73 (indicating that Senator Lott was
determined to continue the slow pace of judicial appointments); Tobias, supra note
61, at 953; supra note 55 and accompanying text.
68. Telephone Interview with Stephan Kline, Alliance for Justice (Nov. 21, 1997).
69. See id.
70. See supra notes 4-28 and accompanying text (providing relevant material
regarding judicial appointments in 1993); see also Carl Tobias, Who's to Blame?
Who Cares? Just Fill Judicial Vacancies, SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 28, 1997, at AA4
(providing relevant 1985 data). In fairness, the Republicans did control the Senate
during 1985.
71. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, The White House, President
Clinton Nominates Sonia Sotomayor to the Federal Bench (June 25, 1997),
http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1997/6/26/1.
text.1; see also supra note 62 (nominating Judge Ware); infra note 79 and
accompanying text (confirming Judge Sotomayor).
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minorities. 72 The success attained was even more notable in light
of the problems experienced assembling the second administration
and finding replacements for the officials primarily responsible for
recruitment.
73
5. Selection During 1998
As in earlier years of the Clinton Administration, the
individuals whom the President appointed in 1998 were
experienced and capable individuals with comparatively moderate
political viewpoints who would enhance gender, racial, and
political diversity on the federal appeals and district courts.
Likewise, the Clinton Administration employed goals and
procedures analogous to those used earlier. 74 It maintained major
responsibility for designating nominees, especially for appeals court
vacancies, and further consolidated its control of the judicial
selection process. It also instituted many special efforts to
delineate and proffer the names of highly competent female and
minority attorneys. 75 Furthermore, the Administration continued to
work carefully with senators, requesting that the senators find
and recommend talented women and minorities and deferring to
senators from the relevant states concerning nominations for
empty district court seats. 76
During 1998, the President named twenty-one female (22%)
and sixteen minority (25%) attorneys out of sixty-five judges to the
federal courts.77 Specifically, President Clinton helped orchestrate
the confirmations of Susan Graber, Margaret McKeown, and
Judge Kim Wardlaw and pressed the appointments of Marsha
Berzon and Judge Richard Paez for Ninth Circuit openings during
1998.78
72. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
73. For example, the White House Counsel as well as the Deputy and Associate
Attorneys General resigned, requiring the Administration to replace them. See
Tobias, supra note 61, at 954.
74. See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 2, at 265; see also supra notes 4-21, 60-
62 and accompanying text.
75. See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 2, at 268-84 (providing biographic and
demographic information about the Clinton appointees).
76. See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 2, at 267-73 (noting that the Clinton
Administration had greater success in the confirmation process in 1998 than in
previous years).
77. See ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, JUDICIAL SELECTION PROJECT: ANNUAL REPORT
2 (1998); Telephone Interview with Stephan Kline, Alliance for Justice (Jan. 6,
1999). The numbers and percentages of women and minorities confirmed rather
closely resemble the relevant figures for 1995. See supra note 50 and
accompanying text.
78. See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 2, at 269-70 (describing Graber and
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Most appointees had relatively moderate political
perspectives and a small number had some association with the
Republican Party. For example, Clinton elevated to the Second
Circuit Sonia Sotomayor, whom President Bush had appointed to
the Southern District of New York.7 9  Moreover, numerous
appointees and nominees had rendered previous valuable service
on a federal or state court bench. For example, Judge Wardlaw,
whom President Clinton elevated to the Ninth Circuit, had ably
served in the Central District of California.8 0  In short, the
President had a laudable judicial selection record during 1998.
The Administration encountered some problems in securing
appointments during the second year of the final term that
resembled the complications that it had confronted in the prior
three years, particularly 1997.81 These difficulties could be
ascribed to Clinton and his Administration, the Senate Judiciary
Committee and its Chair, the Senate Majority Leader, and
individual senators, especially GOP members.8 2 The President
could have tendered more nominees whom Republican senators
found acceptable earlier in 1998; instead, he submitted candidates
somewhat irregularly thereafter.8 3 For example, the President
often forwarded multiple nominees simultaneously, which may
McKeown); Henry Weinstein, L.A. Judge Confirmed to 9th Circuit Post, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 1998, at A22 (describing Wardlaw).
79. See Kline, supra note 44, at 310-11 (discussing the nomination process of
Sotomayor); Neil A. Lewis, After Delay, Senate Approves Judge for Court in New
York, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1998, at B3 (explaining the appointment of Sotomayor);
see also Shannon P. Duffy, Clinton Announces Nominees for Eastern District Court,
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), Aug. 4, 1997, at 1 (relating
the nomination of Bruce W. Kauffnan, a Republican).
80. See 144 CONG. REC. S9670 (daily ed. July 31, 1998) (confirmation of
Wardlaw as United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit); see also Weinstein,
supra note 78, at A22.
81. See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 2, at 267-71 (evaluating the
complications experienced by the Clinton Administration during 1997-1998);
Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 6, at 256-58 (defining the problems the Clinton
Administration had in securing appointments during the second half of the first
term); Tobias, supra note 61, at 952-54 (explaining Clinton's obstacles in appointing
judges); supra notes 40-56, 60-67 and accompanying text.
82. See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 2, at 267-73.
83. See Orrin Hatch, Judicial Nominee Confirmations Snwother Now, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, June 27, 1998, at 9A (relating that the Senate had not received
nominees for many of the remaining vacancies). But see 143 Cong. Rec. S2538
(daily ed. Mar. 19. 1997) (statement of Sen. Biden) (admitting that the Clinton
Administration had not sent enough nominees in a timely fashion in the past two
years, but stating that it was now the Republican senators who were slowing the
pace of the confirmation process), See also Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 2, at




have frustrated the Judiciary Committee's efforts to evaluate the
individuals promptly.
8 4
The Republican leadership in the Senate and individual
Republican senators were also responsible for the comparatively
slow pace of appointments, particularly at the outset of 1998. For
instance, Senator Hatch could have processed nominees more
expeditiously.8 5 Likewise, Senator Lott did not always schedule
floor debates and floor votes on candidates promptly after they had
received favorable Judiciary Committee consideration.8 6 Each of
the major participants in the confirmation process, accordingly,
might have done more to foster expeditious judicial selection. The
Senate had confirmed only forty judges by September. Thereafter,
the pace was quickened only through the cooperation of President
Clinton and Senator Hatch.
Overall in 1998, the President named and nominated large
numbers and percentages of capable female and minority lawyers,
enunciated clear objectives for choosing judges, and followed
efficacious procedures. The success achieved is remarkable, given
the substantial hurdles that the Administration faced, including
the expanded Whitewater investigation and the impeachment
probe.8 7
84. See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 2, at 271-73 (noting the dramatic
increase in delay in the confirmation process during the Republican-controlled
105th Congress); see also supra note 83.
85. Senator Hatch asserted that consideration was delayed by the erratic
manner in which the Administration submitted attorneys and by the fact that some of
the nominees were unacceptable partly because they might be judicial activists. See,
e.g., 144 CONG. REC. S6186 (daily ed. June 11, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
(indicating opposition to the appointment of judicial activists); see also id. at S659
(daily ed. Feb. 11, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (reiterating support for
Margaret Morrow and her absence of judicial activism); Hatch, supra note 83
(recognizing that the confirmation process suffered from lack of cooperation
between the White House and the Senate). But see 143 CONG. REC. S2538-41 (daily
ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Biden) (responding to Republicans' concerns
over judicial activists). See generally Lee Renzin, Note, Advice, Consent and Senate
Inaction - Is Judicial Resolution Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1739, 1746 (1998)
(explaining that Republicans' concerns over judicial activism are misplaced).
86. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. S8477 (daily ed. July 17, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Leahy) (criticizing the slow pace in approving the appointment of Sotomayor); see
also The Senatds Hostage Game, L.A_ TIMES, July 28, 1998, at B6 (discussing the
delay in appointing William Fletcher and indicating that Senator Lott is stalling in
calling for a vote); Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 2, at 272-73 (stating that
Senator Lott played an important role in the delay in floor action on judicial
nominees).
87. See Carney, supra note 67, at 847 (discussing the success of the
Administration in securing appointments despite Clinton's troubles); Goldman &
Slotnick, supra note 2, at 265; see also Charles F.C. Ruff, Lewinsky Probe Has
'Impact' on President, WASH. POST, May 28, 1998, at A16 (indicating the effects
that the Lewinsky matter had on the presidency). See generally RICHARD A.
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6. Selection During 1999
One particularly striking aspect of the appointments process
during 1999 was how substantially it resembled previous judicial
selection. The Clinton Administration exerted much control over
nominee selection and persisted in its special efforts to nominate
skilled women and minorities while working closely with senators
to suggest such individuals. Despite the significant success in
confirming judges that the President and Senator Hatch had
attained only several months earlier, the efforts to fill the seventy
empty seats on the appeals and district courts were stymied by two
primary factors. First, Clinton failed to forward consistently enough
nominees whom Republican senators found acceptable, especially in
the beginning of the year. Second, the Senate impeachment trial of
Clinton effectively discontinued judicial selection. These events
resulted in the Judiciary Committee Chair holding no hearings or
votes on candidates before the middle of June.
The Administration proffered a package of seventeen
appellate and district court nominees promptly upon the
convening of the first session of the 106th Congress and
simultaneously with the commencement of the President's
impeachment trial before the Senate.8 8  The upper chamber
confirmed two nominees for vacant judgeships for the Northern
District of Illinois during March.8 9  However, the Judiciary
Committee conducted no hearings on any of the nominees for the
remaining seventy open positions prior to the summer of 1999.90
The Senate confirmed merely eleven judges from January to
September 1999.91 Yet, thirty-four individuals eventually secured
appointment by the time the senators recessed.
92
impeachment); Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast, Mar. 22, 1998)
(interviewing Senator Lott and discussing the Lewinsky matter and its effects on
the Clinton Administration).
88. See Press Release, Office of the Press Secy, The White House, The
President Nominates Seventeen to the Federal Bench (Jan. 26, 1999)
http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1999/1/26/5.
text.1.
89. See 145 CONG. REC. S3438 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1999) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) (recommending for confirmation William J. Hibbler and Matthew F.
Kennedy to be United States District Judges for the Northern District of Illinois).
90. See Hearings on Judicial Nominees Resume, THIRD BRANCH, July, 1999, at
(noting that the first judicial nomination hearing of 1999 was held on June 16th);
John Heilprin, Hatch Will Go Slow on Nominees, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 9, 1999, at
Al (stating that Senate Judiciary Chairman Orrin Hatch had blocked senate action
on Clinton's nominees to the federal bench in the first part of 1999).
91. See Heilprin, supra note 90.
92. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, Vacancies in the Federal
Judiciary (Sept. 1, 1999), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/09011999/
judgevacancy.htm; see also 145 CONG. REC. S10848 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1999)
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The major obstacle to confirmation during the initial half of
the year was a dispute over a vacancy on the federal district court
in Utah, the state that the Judiciary Committee Chair
represents.93  During early 1999, Senator Hatch began
"demanding that the President nominate a conservative aide to
Republican Governor Mike Leavitt as a federal judge in Salt Lake
City."94 The controversy was exacerbated because the candidate
was a "self-described Ronald Reagan conservative whose views on the
environment are anathema to Clinton and to environmental and
other liberal groups that are politically important to the
Administration."95  Moreover, many Democrats in the state
strongly opposed the attorney's appointment. 96 Clinton ultimately
acceded to Senator Hatch's request by nominating the
conservative lawyer in July.97 Some observers of the judicial
selection process claim that this six-month dispute prevented
serious senate consideration of any nominees apart from the
judges confirmed for the Northern District of Illinois. 98
Notwithstanding the difficulties encountered in the
beginning of the year, thirty-four nominees were confirmed to the
federal bench in 1999. 99 Of those selected, thirteen were female
(38%) and ten were minorities (29%).100 These figures are similar
to those during 1995.101 Again, these judges were intelligent,
industrious, and independent political moderates; only a few have
(statement of Sen. Leahy) (criticizing the tremendous delay in the confirmation of
Richard Paez to the Ninth Circuit); Heilprin, supra note 90 (relating that Senate
Judiciary Chairman Orrin Hatch warned President Clinton that the confirmation
process will not be rushed despite the need to fill vacancies for federal judges).
93. See Carney, supra note 67, at 845; Joan Biskupic, Hatch, White House at
Impasse on Judgeships, WASH. POST, June 5, 1999, at Al; Paul Elias, Berzon's
Ninth Circuit Bid Looks Good, RECORDER (San Francisco, California), June 17,
1999, at 1; Judy Fahys, Utahn is Bottleneck in U.S. Judge Pipeline, SALT LAKE
TRIB., May 17, 1999, at Al; David G. Savage, Federal Benches Left Vacant Over
Utah Tug of War, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1999, at Al.
94. Savage, supra note 93; see also Biskupic, supra note 93; Fahys, supra note
93.
95. Savage, supra note 93; see also Carney, supra note 67, at 845-47; Elias,
supra note 93.
96. See Elias, supra note 93.
97. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, The White House, President Clinton
Nominates Petrese B. Tucker and Brian Theodore Stewart to the Federal Bench (July
.27, 1999), http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/
1999/7/28/19.text.1; see also Carney, supra note 67, at 845 (discussing the
possibility of Clinton's nomination of the aide).
98. See Biskupic, supra note 93; Fahys, supra note 93; Savage, supra note 93;
see also supra note 89 and accompanying text.
99. See ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1999);
Telephone Interview with Nancy Marcus, Alliance for Justice (Mar. 17, 2000).
100. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 91.
101. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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to those during 1995.101 Again, these judges were intelligent,
industrious, and independent political moderates; only a few have
been affiliated with the Republican party. Moreover, numerous
appointees had been members of the federal or state bench. For
example, President Reagan named Judge Ann Claire Williams to the
Northern District of Illinois where she served with distinction until
President Clinton elevated her to the Seventh Circuit.
02
In short, the Clinton Administration successfully discharged
its judicial selection duties during 1999. Clinton enunciated
laudable objectives, used effective means to realize those goals, and
continued to appoint and nominate a number of very capable
women and minorities. These achievements are admirable, given
the significant complications that the Administration experienced.
Although Clinton contributed to some problems, namely his own
impeachment trial, the Republican senators might have done more
to expedite the confirmation process. In the final analysis, the
Administration compiled a commendable record.
II. Selection During 2000
Most of the difficulties that had accompanied the efforts to
choose judges throughout the Clinton presidency manifested
themselves again during Clinton's final year in office. The negative
factors may have been accentuated, because 2000 marked the
conclusion of a two-term administration and was a presidential-
election year, circumstances that meant that the President's
authority, particularly the power to name judges, was at its lowest
point.
The appointment process was sporadic, especially in regard
to the full senate consideration of nominees who had received
favorable Judiciary Committee votes. Until March 9, 2000, when
the entire Senate treated the controversial nominations of Richard
Paez and Marsha Berzon to the Ninth Circuit, the Senate had
approved only four judges. 10 3 Although the upper chamber had
delayed voting on Judge Paez for four years, he and Ms. Berzon
101. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
102. See Matt O'Connor, True to Herself, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 11, 1999, at 1;
Williams OKd for Appeals Court, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 11, 1999, at 6.
103. See 145 CONG. REC. S10848 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1999) (statement of Sen.
Leahy) (criticizing the tremendous delay in the confirmation of Richard Paez to the
Ninth Circuit); 146 CONG. REC. S1368 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2000) (confirming Paez to
be United States Judge for the Ninth Circuit); 146 CONG. REC. S4366 (daily ed. May
24, 2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (noting that the Senate must act on the judicial nominations
promptly and provide the federal judiciary with the resources it needs and to which it is
entitled).
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additional judicial nominees until May 24, partly because of a
controversy that involved the appointment of Professor Bradley
Smith, whom Clinton had nominated to the Federal Election
Commission. 105 When Democrats finally agreed to a floor debate and
vote on Smith, the Senate approved sixteen judges.10 6 Over the
remainder of the year, the Judiciary Committee conducted several
hearings on persons whom Clinton had appointed, approving
some. 107  However, the full Senate considered relatively few
nominees and the process essentially ground to a halt after the
summer presidential nominating conventions.108
Out of the thirty-nine judges named by Clinton in 2000,
eleven were women (28%) and nine were minorities (23%).109
Although the total number of counsel appointed is considerably
smaller than the sixty-plus nominees who secured approval during
the final year of the Bush Administration when the Democrats
controlled the Senate, 110 approximately 100 seats remained vacant
(daily ed. Sept. 14, 1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (criticizing the tremendous
delay in the confirmation of Richard Paez to the Ninth Circuit); 146 CONG. REC.
S1368 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2000) (confirming Paez to be United States Judge for the
Ninth Circuit).
105. See 146 CONG. REC. S4366 (daily ed. May 24, 2000) (statement of Sen.
Leahy) (criticizing the delay in the confirmation process and urging "all Senators to make
the federal administration of justice a top priority for the Senate for the rest of this year"); see
also Thomas L. Jipping, Trading Away the Judiciary, WASH. TIMES, July 25, 2000,
at A17.
106. See Lizette Alvarez, Senate Deal Ends Logjant on Nominee and Judges,
N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2000, at A19; Jonathan Ringel, Senate Gives Bench a Break,
LEGAL TIMES, May 29, 2000, at 15.
107. See Nominations Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
106th Cong. (June 15, 2000), available at http://www.senate.gov/-judiciary/
w16152000.htm; Nominations Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. (July 25, 2000), available at http://www.senate.gov/
-judiciary/w17252000.htm.
108. See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. S7457 (daily ed. July 21, 2000) (confirming
Rawlinson for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals); see also Jonathan Ringel, Fate
of Clinton's Judicial Appointees Draws Near, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP. (Atlanta,
Georgia), Aug. 9, 2000, at 1.
109. Telephone Interview with Nan Aron, Alliance for Justice (Nov. 10, 2000); E-
mail from Elaine Weiss, Alliance for Justice, to Carl Tobias, Professor of Law,
William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas (Dec. 22, 2000,
08:44:28 AM) (on file with author).
110. See 143 CONG. REC. S2539 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Sarbanes); Sheldon Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy: The Final Imprint, 76
JUDICATURE 282, 284 (1993); Tobias, supra note 2, at 1239 (recognizing that Bush
appointed eighteen women out of the sixty-eight judges confirmed in his final year
of his presidency); Helen Dewar, Hatch Denies Bias on Judicial Nominees, WASH.
POST, July 21, 2000, at A29. See generally Gerhardt, supra note 55, at 1394
(explaining that presidents in election years face many difficulties in having their
nominees confirmed); Jonathan Ringel, 35 Judicial Nominees Stalled in Congress
by Election-Year Politics, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), Aug.
7, 2000, at 5 (same).
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when President Bush left office,"' a statistic that contrasts with
the fewer than seventy judgeships which were open at the
conclusion of the Clinton Administration. 112 Furthermore, those
individuals who were confirmed seem to be very talented. For
instance, Judge Paez had been a highly regarded jurist in the
Central District of California before being elevated to the Ninth
Circuit." 3 Thus, the Clinton Administration capably completed its
judicial selection duties during 2000, particularly in light of the
complications created by the last year of a two-term
administration and by election-year politics.
In sum, over the course of President Clinton's second term,
the President honored the promises that he had made when
campaigning for the White House and reiterated once in office."
4
The Administration appointed 174 attorneys, who attained the
highest ratings which the ABA has ever assigned; fifty-one (29%)
of the judges are women and forty-two (24%) are minorities.
115
This record is unparalleled in the nation's history. Nearly half of
the judges whom Clinton named during his two terms are women or
minorities." 6 Also, Clinton appointed more African Americans than
in the previous sixteen years and more Hispanic Americans than the
Bush and Reagan Administrations combined.'
17
III. Suggestions for the Future
Suggestions related to the judicial selection objectives that
newly-elected President George W. Bush should articulate and
how he and his Administration may achieve the goals require
POST, July 21, 2000, at A29. See generally Gerhardt, supra note 55, at 1394
(explaining that presidents in election years face many difficulties in having their
nominees confirmed); Jonathan Ringel, 35 Judicial Nominees Stalled in Congress
by Election-Year Politics, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), Aug.
7, 2000, at 5 (same).
111. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 110, at 297; Tobias, supra note 1, at 1237.
See generally Renzin, supra note 85, at 1743 n. 16 (discussing judicial vacancy rates
during the Reagan and Bush Administrations); Jipping, supra note 105 (arguing
that Democrats allowed the confirmation process to slow during the Bush
Administration).
112. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, Vacancies in the Federal
Judiciary, Nov. 3, 2000, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/
judgevacancy.htm.
113. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text (discussing Clinton's vow to
increase the percentage of women and minorities on the federal judiciary).
115. See President Clinton Urges Senate to Confirm Judicial Nominees, U.S.






treatment in this Essay. Nonetheless, some general issues which
the President and his staff will confront and certain, specific matters
that might arise deserve exploration, while the need to appoint
additional women and minorities as well as to fill the many existing
judicial vacancies merit assessment.
A. General Ideas
A recently-elected administration should attempt to anticipate
and minimize the problems in naming judges that all nascent
presidencies inevitably face. These include the myriad legal, policy,
and political questions that attend the creation and operation of a
new administration and on which the White House Counsel and
Department of Justice must furnish advice. A trenchant
illustration of the work's daunting nature and of the need to set
priorities is that judgeships constitute only a minuscule
percentage of the many appointments a president must make. 119
Difficulties that relate specifically to choosing judges encompass
the establishment of selection objectives and the development of
efficacious means to realize them. For example, President Bush and
his assistants must decide whether they should assign high priorities
to naming more female and minority lawyers, as well as to
confirming judges for the numerous open seats. A number of
reasons stated earlier and some considered below suggest that both
goals warrant emphasis and can be attained.
The President and his Administration should correspondingly
formulate effective practices to secure the objectives that it
enunciates by determining the respective responsibilities that the
White House and the Department of Justice will assume for
particular aspects of the selection process. For example, the
President and his staff should decide whether the White House will
retain principal authority for the identification of potential
nominees generally and whether it will control the filling of specific
appellate court vacancies. The President and his Administration
should also decide whether the Justice Department will continue to
be responsible for scrutinizing most individuals only after the
persons are serious candidates. Finally, the President and his
assistants must decide the amount of deference they wish to
accord senators, especially for district court openings that occur in
the states that senate members represent.
Federal Judicial Selection, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1257, 1274-85 (1993).
119. For a sense of other difficulties that plagued the Clinton Administration's




The last four presidential administrations have followed
relatively similar procedures. 120 For example, the White House
has maintained primary control over the delineation of possible
nominees. In particular, the White House has controlled the
delineation of nominees for the appeals courts even though the
Department of Justice exercised considerable responsibility for
evaluating candidates. Moreover, the presidents have deferred
substantially to home-state senators when they chose district court
nominees.
The nascent administration must institute special efforts to
cooperate with the Chair of the Judiciary Committee, with the
panel's remaining members and with specific senators. The
President should consult the lawmakers by seeking their advice
before he formally tenders the names of individual candidates.
The President and his staff should also submit nominees as
steadily as possible. These measures will facilitate consideration of
candidates by the Judiciary Committee and other entities
participating in the judicial confirmation process, such as the FBI
and the ABA, and maximize the prospects for filling all of the
vacancies on the federal bench.
B. Specific Ideas
1. Why the New Administration Should Appoint Additional
Women and Minorities
There are several reasons why President Bush should place
significant numbers of female and minority attorneys on the
federal courts. One reason is that most of these judges will
enhance their colleagues' appreciation of controversial public
policy issues that the federal judiciary must resolve, including
abortion and discrimination. 12 1 Considerable evidence suggests
that the American public has greater confidence in a federal bench
whose membership resembles the composition of its citizenry. 122 A
more diverse judiciary may also enhance substantive decision-
120. See GOLDMAN, supra note 7 (providing an in-depth analysis of the
Presidential administrations of Carter, Reagan, Bush and Clinton).
121. See, e.g., Theresa M. Beiner, What Will Diversity on the Bench Mean for
Justice?, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 113, 150-51 (1999); Marion Zenn Goldberg,
Carter.Appointed Judge: Perspectives on Gender, TRIAL, Apr. 1990, at 108. See
generally Elliot E. Slotnick, Lowering the Bench or Raising it Higher?: Affirmative
Action and Judicial Selection During the Carter Administration, 1 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 270 (1983).




making. 123 Numerous women and minorities, such as Justice
Ginsburg and Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, have
rendered excellent service.
124
A second reason is that the appointment of additional women
and minorities could help to reduce gender, racial, and ethnic bias
in the federal civil and criminal justice systems. 125 The number of
female and minority judges named and nominated reflects the
Administration's commitment to the improvement of
circumstances for women and minorities in the nation, in the
federal courts, and in the legal profession. 1
26
A third reason to appoint more female and minority lawyers
is the need to remedy or ameliorate the lack of gender, racial, and
political balance in the present federal judiciary. Approximately
half of the judges were named by Presidents Reagan and Bush.
127
African Americans constituted fewer than two percent of the
judges chosen by the Reagan Administration. 128 President Bush
similarly selected only ten African Americans, one Asian
American, and nine Hispanic Americans. 129  Moreover, the
Republican Presidents seemed to appoint some nominees, at least
in part, for the individuals' politically conservative viewpoints. 1
30
123. See Jennifer A- Segal, The Decision Making of Clinton's Nontraditional
Judicial Appointees, 80 JUDICATURE 279 (1997); Donald R. Songer et al., A
Reappraisal of Diversification in the Federal Courts: Gender Effects in the Court of
Appeals, 56 J. POL. 425 (1994); see also Beiner, supra note 121, at 137-51
(recognizing that this assertion is controversial and analyzing the studies of
decisionmaking by female and minority judges); Tobias, supra note 118, at 1262-64.
124. See Carl Tobias, More Wonwn Named Federal Judges, 43 FLA. L. REV. 477,
483 (1991); see also Tobias, supra note 1, at 1244 (recognizing that President Bush
appointed several prominent women, many of whom were excellent judges); supra
notes 12, 14 and accompanying text (describing President Clinton's judicial
selection process which included vigorous efforts to appoint more women and
minorities to the bench).
125. See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 169 (Apr. 2, 1990);
see generally Commentaries on Bias in the Federal Courts, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 647
(1998) (containing reports from each circuit on the existence of bias in the courts
and remedial steps being taken).
126. See Carl Tobias, More Women Named Federal Judges, 43 FLA. L. REV. 477,
483 (1991) (identifying the judicial appointments made by President Bush); see also
Beiner, supra note 121, at 145; Tobias, supra note 10, at 175-76 (noting that
successful women already in power may help pave the way for others).
127. See Carney, supra note 67, at 845 (criticizing President Clinton for his
concessions in appointments); Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 2, at 283.
128. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 1237.
129. See Goldman, supra note 110, at 287, 293 tbl.4 (providing a breakdown of
the judiciary's ethnic and racial makeup during the presidencies of Johnson
through Bush); Tobias, supra note 1, at 1237.
130. See Carney, supra note 67, at 846-47; Tobias, supra note 118, at 1264-74;
see also infra note 148.
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Republican Presidents seemed to appoint some nominees, at least
in part, for the individuals' politically conservative viewpoints.
13 0
It is difficult to understand exactly why Presidents Reagan
and Bush named such small numbers of female and minority
judges because their administrations had the opportunity to
choose from considerably bigger and more experienced pools of
women and minorities than President Carter. In 1980 when the
Reagan Administration began, there were only 62,000 female
attorneys in the United States. 131 By the end of his Administration,
80,000 additional women had entered the legal profession.
1 32
Many of these attorneys had secured valuable experience in a
broad spectrum of public and private practice settings or had
undertaken innovative work in law schools.1 33 The number of
African-American, Hispanic-American, and Asian-American
lawyers similarly increased from 23,000 to 51,000 during the same
time period.134 These lawyers succeeded in numerous challenging
endeavors, such as the pursuit of novel cases and the publication
of groundbreaking scholarship.1
35
A final reason to appoint more women and minorities is the
need for filling all of the positions on the federal appellate and
district bench that are currently open. This would permit the
executive branch to function with the complete complement of the
federal judiciary. 136 Confirming attorneys for these empty seats
would improve the resolution of criminal cases and reduce the
substantial civil backlogs in district courts. 137 Furthermore, it
would facilitate the disposition of burgeoning appellate dockets.1
38
130. See Carney, supra note 67, at 846-47; Tobias, supra note 118, at 1264-74;
see also infra note 148.
131. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 1241 n.22.
132. See id.
133. See Tobias supra note 1 at 1246-47; Tobias, supra note 118, at 1280-81. See
generally Deborah J. Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, Sex, Race, and Credentials: The
Truth About Affirmative Action in Law Faculty Hiring, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 199
(1997); Deborah J. Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, The Double Minority: Empirical
Evidence of a Double Standard in Law School Hiring of Minority Women, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 2299 (1992).
134. See ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, JUDICIAL SELECTION PROJECT, ANNUAL REPORT
3 (1992); see also supra note 133 and accompanying text.
135. See ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 134.
136. Congress has authorized 179 federal appellate court positions and 649
federal district court positions. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 44, 133 (2000).
137. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE
FEDERAL COURTS 42, 103-05 (1995) (assessing caseloads and slowed judicial
selection); ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, JUDICIAL SELECTION PROJECT MID-YEAR REPORT
4 (1994) (analyzing civil backlogs).
138. See supra note 137.
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Filling the vacancies could also remedy the "looming crisis in the
Nation" feared by many national legal associations. 139
2. How the New Administration Can Appoint Additional
Women and Minorities
Recommendations for how President George W. Bush and his
Administration might place additional female and minority
lawyers on the federal bench require comparatively little
assessment here because several analogous suggestions have
already been proffered by certain federal court observers and
elsewhere in this Essay.140 Nevertheless, numerous additional
ideas can be provided. First, the President should capitalize on
the effective actions implemented by previous administrations.
For example, the President and his aides should assess effective
means of revitalizing efforts instituted by the former Clinton and
Bush Administrations to find, evaluate, and nominate talented
female and minority candidates. These measures include contacting
every member of the Senate in their respective political parties and
urging the lawmakers to search for and propose women and
minorities.' 41 Second, the nascent administration should evaluate
new methods of proceeding and invoke resources that have not yet
been employed.
142
The selection of Supreme Court Justices and appeals court
judges warrants relatively limited analysis because President
Bush will probably maintain considerable control over the
139. See Letter to William J. Clinton, President, from N. Lee Cooper, ABA
President, et al., July 14, 1997, reprinted in 143 CONG. REC. S8504 (daily ed. July
31, 1997). But see Thomas L. Jipping, Clinton's Judges Promote Politically Correct
Agenda, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Sept. 17, 1999, at 15B (rejecting the idea of a crisis).
140. For example, paramount to the promotion of women and minorities to the
federal judicial is a strong commitment embraced by a president and his staff. See
Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 2, at 284; see also Tobias, supra note 1, at 1245-49
(describing President Clinton's pledge to appoint more women to the federal
judiciary); Tobias, supra note 118, at 1274-85 (suggesting that the federal judiciary
should be comprised of more women and minorities); supra notes 17-21 and
accompanying text (describing efforts by the Clinton Administration and
Democratic senators to increase the female and minority representation in the
federal judiciary).
141. See, e.g., supra note 19 (affording Clinton's request); Carl Tobias, More
Women Named Federal Judges, 43 FLA. L. REV. 477, 479-80 (1991) (affording
Bush's request). The new administration could even consider reinstituting the
Circuit Judge Nominating Commission that President Carter used. See supra note
11 and accompanying text.
142. For helpful, recent suggestions that could expedite selection, see Citizens
for Independent Courts, Report of the Task Force on Federal Judicial Selection, 51
ADMIN. L. REV. 1031 (1999); Committee of the American Judicature Society,




nomination process for vacancies in those positions.143 Therefore,
the President and the Office of White House Counsel must
emphasize the need for additional female and minority judicial
appointments and develop the best techniques for attaining this
objective. The Clinton Administration's initiatives could provide an
informative template for structuring the executive action.
The procedures for choosing district court nominees deserve
somewhat greater exploration since all presidents have exercised
deference to senators of the areas where openings have arisen.
First, President Bush should first identify a prominent public
forum in which he announces a strong commitment to naming
large numbers of women and minorities. 44 Second, the President
might encourage senators to institute mechanisms, such as district
court nominating commissions, that will designate and promote the
candidacies of very competent female and minority counsel.
145
Third, the President should enlist the aid of every female senator,
because those legislators can convince their colleagues to
recommend additional women and minorities and help facilitate
the approval of nominees. 146 Fourth, both the executive branch
and senators should seek assistance from individuals and
institutions that may help to delineate numerous female and
minority attorneys, including state and local bar associations,
women's groups, and minority political organizations.
The abilities and networking of women and minorities, who
now comprise more than a quarter of the legal profession in the
United States, will be important to the efforts discussed above.
Equally significant might be the endeavors and contacts of female
and minority Cabinet members, such as Secretary of Agriculture,
Ann Veneman, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Mel
Martinez, and Secretary of State, Colin Powell, as well as other
women and minorities across the federal government. 147
143. See Tobias, supra note 2, at 316-17; Goldman, supra note 2, at 279.
144. See, e.g., supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text (describing President
Clinton's announcement of his commitment to a more diverse judiciary).
145. See, e.g., supra note 10 and accompanying text (explaining President
Carter's use of district court nominating commissions to promote the confirmation
of numerous female and minority attorneys to the federal judiciary); see also supra
notes 14-15 and accompanying text (describing the importance of the President
gaining support from senators to expedite and effectuate his judicial selection
process).
146. See, e.g., supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text (describing how senators
influence the judicial selection process); see also Goldman supra note 2, at 279
(recounting how females within the Clinton Administration promoted the
expansion of women to federal judicial positions).
147. See Tobias, supra note 2, at 1248-49; Goldman supra note 2, at 279
(recounting how females within the Clinton Administration promoted the
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3. A Word About Politics and Filling the Federal Bench
The above examination of the appointments process during
several years of the Clinton Administration, especially in 2000,
indicates that the small number of judges named and the
comparatively few women and minorities confirmed can be
attributed partly to political considerations. Therefore, recently-
elected President Bush must analyze carefully the impacts of
politics on selection generally, and on the choice of female and
minority judges specifically. Moreover, politics is an intrinsic
feature of judicial appointments, one that will receive much scrutiny
at the Bush Administration's commencement.
It is difficult to predict exactly how political phenomena will
influence selection, particularly of women and minorities. One
important factor that the Republican and Democratic Parties
should evaluate is whether the President's margin of victory is a
mandate for change from the American electorate, both generally
and as to specific judicial appointments. 148 A related idea is how
much the President wants to emphasize nominees' political
perspectives, especially vis-A-vis the time-honored, merit-based
qualifications, such as intelligence, diligence, independence, and
balanced temperament. 149
Another significant factor that warrants assessment is the
nascent status of the administration. Most recently-elected
presidents have been able to rely on a reservoir of good will and to
exercise considerable authority, particularly when choosing judges,
despite the finite political capital that they have to expend on these
appointments.1
50
The establishment of a new administration may also raise
innumerable issues, some that can be anticipated and others that
are unpredictable. In the arena of judicial selection, foreseeable
questions will include how much control the White House should
expansion of women to federal judicial positions); supra note 5 and accompanying
text (discussing how Attorney General Janet Reno proclaimed that she would
promote balance in the judiciary).
148. For example, President Reagan claimed that he had a mandate to appoint
conservative judges. See DAVID O'BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETTE 60-64 (1988); Tobias,
supra note 118, at 1264-65; see also Robert A. Carp et al., The Voting Behavior of
Judges Appointed By President Bush, 76 JUDICATURE 298 (1993) (describing the
same mandate for President Bush).
149. One reason espoused for slow processing of certain Clinton Administration
nominees was their potential to be "judicial activists." See supra notes 64, 66, 85
and accompanying text.
150. The Clinton Administration had a well-known aversion to spending political
capital on judicial selection, especially on controversial candidates. See Goldman &
Slotnick, supra note 6, at 270; Kline, supra note 44, at 315-22; see also supra notes
43-45 and accompanying text.
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retain over the process, the amount of deference to accord senators
when designating nominees for appellate and district court
vacancies, and how closely to confer with the Senate Judiciary
Committee, its Chair, and individual senators. Less predictable,
albeit probable, are the resignations of Supreme Court Justices,
although their precise number and timing defy accurate
prognostication.1 51 Unforeseeable issues will include many political
controversies, most of which tangentially involve judicial selection
but may significantly affect it, nonetheless. 5 2 The President must
remember that a single dispute that implicates the choice of
judges can delay the entire appointment process, as the controversies
over nominees for the vacancies on the Utah district court and the
Federal Election Commission so vividly demonstrate.
53
The propositions above might have numerous, important
consequences for the recruitment of judges throughout the nascent
administration, especially at its outset. First, judicial selection
may not proceed very smoothly or expeditiously, at least during the
initial year of the presidency. For example, the Bush Administration
will need to establish, experiment with, and refine its system for
choosing judges and the Senate must institute and calibrate the
confirmation process. In doing so, each political party will
probably attempt to test the other's limits, particularly in terms of
the perceived political viewpoints that candidates possess. Second,
the judicial nominees who are most likely to win confirmation will be
individuals deemed acceptable by both Democratic and Republican
senators. Thus, political moderation and amenability to
compromise may be paramount.
Generally, the President and administration staff should
closely cooperate with, and be responsive to, the Senate.
Moreover, they must attempt to maximize efficiency by anticipating
and treating the foreseeable and less predictable developments.
The Supreme Court resignations are illustrative. Because
identifying excellent successors can deplete the already scarce
resources available for appeals and district court recruitment,
15 4
151. See, e.g., supra note 27 and accompanying text (describing how the Clinton
Administration was forced to expend much effort in naming a successor for
Supreme Court Justice Byron R. White only two months after Clinton's
inauguration).
152. See, e.g., supra note 87 and accompanying text (describing how the
Whitewater investigation and impeachment probe of President Clinton may have
stymied the judicial selection process in 1998).
153. See supra notes 93-98, 105 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., supra note 27 and accompanying text (describing how the Clinton
Administration was forced to expend much effort in naming a successor for
Supreme Court Justice Byron R. White only two months after Clinton's
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the President and his aides should plan for this contingency. The
Administration might compile a list of several potential nominees,
but it should recognize that the choice would ultimately depend on
the complex constellation of variables that obtain only after a
specific resignation materializes. Those factors include political
phenomena, such as whether the vacancy occurs during an
election year or during a Supreme Court term when the Justices
have issued many controversial opinions.
The President and his Administration should also analyze
how they can appoint additional, talented female and minority
judges and attain other significant goals, namely filling the nearly
seventy current vacancies on the federal bench. In doing so, the
President and staff may wish to assess and deploy certain
measures. One specific direct action would be to nominate
candidates, many of whom are capable women and minorities, for
every open seat. If the political party that does not control the
White House refuses to cooperate, the President could force the
issue by using the presidency as a bully pulpit to criticize the
opposition. 155  Another possibility may be to orchestrate the
introduction and passage of a judgeships bill.156 The President
could premise this initiative on the congressional recommendations
for additional judicial positions.1 57 The President might even
consider permitting Democrats to propose some nominees in
exchange for its approval of his candidates or for passage of a
judgeships measure.
58
155. See supra note 142.
156. See, e.g., Federal Judgeship Act of 1999, S. 1145, 106th Cong. (1999). See
generally Can the Federal Courts Cope Without More Judges?, THIRD BRANCH, Nov.
1999, at 8 (analyzing whether the courts need more judges).
157. The congressional recommendations are supported by conservative
estimates of a substantial increase in judicial workloads and courts' dockets since
1990, when lawmakers last enacted judgeships legislation. See Carl Tobias,
Choosing Federal Judges in the Second Clinton Administration, 23 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 744, 753 (1997). But see Charles E. Grassley, Chairman's Report on
the Appropriate Allocation of Judgeships in the United States Courts of Appeals
(1999), available at http://www.senate.gov/-grassley/releases/1999/p9rO3-07.htm
(recommending that no additional judgeships be created); J. Harvie Wilkinson, III,
The Drawbacks of Growth in the Federal Judiciary, 43 EMORY L.J. 1147, 1161-63
(1994) (suggesting that more judges are not needed). See also ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS
1999 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 16, 19, 23-25 (outlining data on filings);
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 137, at 103-05 (assessing caseloads
of federal judiciary).
158. See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 6, at 271; see also Federal Judgeship Act of
1999, S. 1145, 106th Cong. (1999). A judgeships bill may be an empty gesture, unless
the confirmation process can be improved. See Gordon Bermant et al., Judicial
Vacancies: An Examination of the Problem and Possible Solutions, 14 MISS. C. L.




President Bill Clinton appointed unprecedented numbers of
highly qualified female and minority judges, although his
Administration achieved less success in its final year and left
almost seventy seats empty. If President George W. Bush
capitalizes on the lessons to be derived from the judicial selection
efforts of the last four presidents, the nascent administration can
name additional women and minorities while filling all of the
current vacancies on the federal courts.
Government, 47 EMORY L.J. 527 (1998).
20011

